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 Abstract 
In this paper we develop and test an encompassing theoretical framework for the 
explanation of the geographical and temporal spread of extreme right violence. 
This framework combines internal precipitating factors related to ethnic 
competition, social disintegration, and political opportunity structures, which make 
certain localities more prone to exhibit ethnic violence, with diffusion variables 
that determine the degree to which ethnic violence diffuses across time and 
across localities. We employ an event history analysis of instances of racist 
violence in 444 German counties for the time period 1990-1995. In line with 
previous research we demonstrate that political opportunities, ethnic competition 
and social disorganization, media coverage, and the severity of previous violence 
are significant explanatory factors for the evolution of xenophobic violence. In 
contrast to previous research we find that geographical distance does not affect 
the diffusion of ethnic violence when controlling for social similarity which exerts a 
significant influence on diffusion. Results make a strong case for empirically 
neglected homophily arguments.  
Keywords:  Collective action, Diffusion, Germany, Social movements, 
Xenophobia  
  
Zusammenfassung  
In diesem Papier wird ein umfassender theoretischer Rahmen für die Erklärung 
der geographischen und zeitlichen Ausbreitung rechtsextremistischer Gewalt 
entwickelt und getestet. Dieser theoretische Rahmen verbindet interne Auslöser, 
die mit ethnischer Konkurrenz, sozialer Desintegration und politischen 
Gelegenheitsstrukturen zusammenhängen und aufgrund derer bestimmte 
Ortschaften eher anfällig für ethnisch motivierte Gewalt werden, mit 
Diffusionsvariablen, die bestimmen, in welchem Grade sich ethnische Gewalt 
über die Zeit und über Ortschaften hinweg ausbreitet. Mittels Ereignis-
datenanalyse werden Fälle rassistischer Gewalt untersucht, die sich in dem 
Zeitraum 1990-1995 in 444 deutschen Kreisen ereigneten. In Übereinstimmung 
mit früheren Befunden wird gezeigt, dass politische Gelegenheiten, ethnische 
Konkurrenz und soziale Desorganisation, Medienberichterstattung und der 
Schweregrad vorhergegangener Gewalttaten signifikante erklärende Faktoren für 
die Entwicklung fremdenfeindlicher Gewalt sind. Die Autoren stellen jedoch im 
Gegensatz zu anderen vorliegenden Studien fest, dass die geographische 
Entfernung die Ausbreitung ethnischer Gewalt nicht beeinflusst, wenn um soziale 
Ähnlichkeit kontrolliert wird, die einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Diffusion hat. 
Die Ergebnisse liefern starke Argumente für das empirisch vernachlässigte 
Konzept von Homophilie.  
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 Introduction 
Following its reunification Germany witnessed a strong upsurge in extreme right 
violence targeting asylum seekers and other immigrant groups, peaking in 1992 
and leveling off during the subsequent years (see Figure 1). This wave of 
violence resulted in up to a hundred casualties, thousands of injuries, and 
extensive material damage (Kurthen, Bergmann and Erb, 1997). In this paper we 
provide a systematic analysis of factors that can account for this wave of 
xenophobic violence. Our framework combines precipitating factors related to 
ethnic competition, social disintegration, and political opportunity structures, 
which make certain localities more prone to exhibit ethnic violence, with diffusion 
variables that determine the degree to which ethnic violence diffuses across time 
and across localities. Our approach brings together several strands of research, 
but adds a number of refinements, particularly where the determinants of 
diffusion are concerned.  
Diffusion studies on mobilization have shown that geographical distance matters 
(e.g., Gould, 1991; Hedstrom, 1994; Myers, 2000; Andrews and Biggs, 2006). 
Most of these studies consider geographical distance to be a proxy for a social 
 
Figure 1:  The evolution of xenophobic violence in Germany, 1990-1995 
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Source:  MERCI (Koopmans and Statham, 1999), European Protest and Coercion Data 
(2007). 
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relationship. But as Tarde ([1890] 1921) remarked long ago, geographical 
distance as such is not socially relevant; what matters is distance in the 
sociological sense. Few diffusion studies of protest in general, or of ethnic 
violence in particular, have however tried to measure social distance (or 
“homophily” as it is also known in the diffusion literature) directly. Studies that do 
examine social similarity (Soule, 1997) do not take into account geographical 
distance. In this paper, we show that when we include political, socio-economic, 
and demographic measures of homophily, geographical distance no longer 
matters, providing strong support for social similarity arguments. 
We combine the homophily perspective on diffusion with insights from recent 
work that has shown that media attention creates “discursive opportunities” that 
facilitate the diffusion of protest. In line with earlier studies, we show that media 
visibility of events increases diffusion rates. We further provide strong evidence 
for a contested conjuncture in the literature on extreme right movements, which 
claims that xenophobic violence is lower where right-wing parties are strong. 
While the empirical literature contains several indications in this direction and it 
also fits findings for left-wing movements, much of the literature on xenophobia 
and the extreme right supposes (but rarely demonstrates) the opposite, namely 
that strong right-wing parties create through their anti-immigrant rhetoric a fertile 
soil for racist violence.  
We investigate the merits of our approach through an analysis of data on 
xenophobic violence in Germany in the period 1990-1995. We methodologically 
improve over earlier studies on this topic in several ways. First, we combine two 
independently gathered datasets, one based on a detailed coding of a single 
national newspaper (see Koopmans, 2001), and another based on a more 
extensive search of a wide range of media sources (Francisco, 1996). Second, 
we analyze the data on a much more detailed level of analysis than previous 
studies. First, we employ event history analysis and therefore use information on 
the exact timing of events, in contrast to earlier studies, which have aggregated 
events to months (e.g., Brosius and Esser, 1995; Koopmans, 2001) or years 
(Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Second, whereas earlier studies were conducted 
only on the national level or across the sixteen German federal states, we use 
the most fine-grained administrative unit for which statistical data are available in 
Germany, the county (“Kreis”), allowing us to compare, and analyze diffusion 
across more than 400 geographical units. We use a more fine-grained operatio-
nalization of social homophily across geographical units than any study of protest 
diffusion that we are aware of, which is based on pairwise calculations of 
differences regarding the demographic, political, and socio-economic charac-
teristics of counties.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first give an overview of theories of 
ethnic violence and introduce the various aspects of internal conduciveness and 
determinants of diffusion that we want to investigate in this study. We then 
introduce our data and method, and describe the operationalization of the various 
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theoretical concepts and the empirical expectations attached to them. The results 
provide strong support for the role of homophily and media attention in the 
diffusion of violence. In support of the political opportunity structure perspective, 
we also find that violence is lower where right-wing parties are electorally strong. 
To some extent we also find supporting evidence for ethnic competition (Olzak, 
1986) and social disorganization theories of ethnic violence (Heitmeyer et al., 
1992). 
Conduciveness theories 
Theories of ethnic violence can be classified into two broad categories, which we 
label as “conduciveness” and “diffusion” theories. Conduciveness theories 
emphasize the local precipitating conditions that make certain cities, regions, or 
countries more likely to exhibit high rates of ethnic violence. Which precipitating 
conditions are emphasized varies across studies. An important strand of 
research has emphasized “ethnic competition,” the struggle between ethnic 
groups over scarce resources, most importantly jobs. In his classic study Race 
and Culture, Park (1950) claims that eventually all ethnic groups will assimilate to 
the host society. However, before this final destination is reached, societies pass 
through the transitional stages of the race relations cycle. One of these stages is 
the stage of ethnic competition in which ethnic minorities come to compete with 
the native population over scarce resources. Increased competition, argues Park, 
leads to an intensification of ethnic group identification, which in its turn produces 
more strict ethnic boundaries. 
Later followers of the work of Park, of whom Olzak is perhaps the most 
prominent, have elaborated on his work and used it to study collective action 
based on ethnic boundaries (Olzak, 1986; Olzak and Shanahan, 1996). The main 
idea underlying this work is that rigid group boundaries that follow from ethnic 
competition are a necessary condition for the occurrence of collective action 
along ethnic lines. Ethnic competition theorists have mainly focused on labour 
market competition, holding that economic contraction and the presence of 
immigrants spark violent mobilization of ethnic groups. In this view, ethnic 
violence is most likely to occur where both ethnic immigration and unemployment 
rates are high (e.g., Bélanger and Pinard, 1991; Olzak, 1992; Nagel, 1996).  
Disorganization theorists on the other hand state that collective violence is a 
product of malintegration of society. In line with the classical work of Durkheim, it 
is argued that the absence of social ties in combination with organizational 
dissolution and deteriorating solidarity increases the propensity for citizens to get 
engaged in collective violence (Oberschall, 1973). This strand of theorizing is 
particularly influential in the study of the extreme right and xenophobic violence 
and emphasizes that the “losers of the modernization process” (Heitmeyer et al., 
1992) are susceptible to scapegoating immigrants for their problems (e.g., Krell 
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et al., 1996; McLaren, 1999). In contrast to ethnic competition theory, high levels 
of immigration are in this view not a necessary condition for xenophobic violence, 
as the main causes of ethnic violence are related to the anomic condition of the 
perpetrators, and immigrants may become scapegoats even where there are 
relatively few of them.  
A third strand of theory treats ethnic violence as part of a wider political process 
and emphasizes political opportunity structure variables such as the party-
political power configuration (e.g., Kriesi et al., 1995). In their four-country 
comparative study, Kriesi et al. (1995) showed that left-libertarian new social 
movements achieved the highest levels of mobilization during times when right-
wing governments were in office. During such periods, these movements 
received more support from established left-wing parties. Conversely, they 
argued that during periods of left-wing dominance, new social movement 
mobilization is inhibited by a “reform” effect (in contrast to a “threat” effect under 
right-wing governments), which leads activists to choose the less costly and risky 
and in these periods of friendly government probably also more effective path of 
electoral politics and lobbying over extra-institutional mobilization. Several 
studies show that a similar relationship holds for the extraparliamentary radical 
right, which tends to mobilize most in countries where extreme right parties are 
weak. Koopmans found considerable evidence for this notion by comparing 
extreme right violence in eight European countries. Countries where extreme 
right parties were strongly represented in parliament experienced lower rates of 
xenophobic violence than countries in which extreme right political parties were 
electorally weak (Koopmans, 1996; see also Giugni et al., 2005). 
Diffusion theories 
Their differences notwithstanding, the above theoretical perspectives all 
emphasize “internal” factors that make some localities more and others less likely 
to exhibit ethnic violence, either because of the psychological states of people in 
these localities caused by feelings of ethnic threat and anomie, or because of 
strategic considerations of the local political opportunity structure. By contrast, 
diffusion theories emphasize that decisions to engage in ethnic violence are not 
taken in local isolation, but are often based on imitation. As a result, ethnic 
violence, like other forms of protest (McAdam, 1982), often occurs in waves that 
diffuse rapidly across local and sometimes also national boundaries, as activists 
imitate the examples of like-minded activists in other localities (Biggs, 2003; 
Oliver and Myers, 2003). In emphasizing imitation, diffusion theories of ethnic 
violence build on the more general literature on the diffusion of innovations 
(Soule, 2004).  
According to Rogers’ influential definition, diffusion is “the process by which an 
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the 
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members of a social system” (Rogers 1995: 5). The diffusion perspective (for an 
overview, see Strang and Soule, 1998) has been applied to a variety of topics, 
including agricultural technologies and crop varieties (e.g., Rogers, 1995), drugs 
(e.g., Coleman et al., 1957; Burt, 1987), riots (e.g., Myers, 2000), business 
models (e.g., Strang and Macy, 2001), collective action frames (e.g., McAdam 
and Rucht, 1993), and the spread of democracy (e.g. Starr, 1991).  
Which factors determine the diffusion chances of innovations? Gabriel Tarde’s 
study of the “laws of imitation” ([1890] 1921) still provides a useful starting point. 
Tarde begins by distinguishing “logical” from “non-logical” causes of diffusion. 
Logical causes are those that directly follow from the inherent and observable 
qualities of an innovation, non-logical causes are those that derive from the social 
relations between source and adopter. The reason why imitation is often based 
on social factors rather than on the inherent qualities of an innovation is that 
information about these qualities is often unavailable or incomplete and 
uncertain. Under conditions of limited information and uncertainty, following 
social cues is often an efficient way of finding adaptive solutions to life problems 
(Simon, 1983; Boyd and Richerson, 1985). However, imitation based on social 
cues can sometimes also be maladaptive. Rogers (1995) gives several examples 
of socially driven (non)adoption of innovations that were suboptimal or even 
harmful from the point of view of the innovation’s contribution to people’s quality 
of life.  
A core finding from the diffusion literature regarding the social determinants of 
diffusion is the importance of “homophily” between sources and adopters, which 
Rogers defines as “the degree to which two or more individuals who interact are 
similar in certain attributes, such as beliefs, education, social status, and the like” 
(1995: 18-19). Tarde similarly observed: “In fact, it is as a direct result of the 
distance to the model, and not just of its superiority, that the latter’s influence is 
effective. Distance is to be understood here in the sociological sense of the word” 
([1890] 1921: 243; emphasis in the original, our translation from the French). Why 
homophily between model and adopter should increase rates of diffusion is easily 
understood. Because of the similarity between the two, innovations that are used 
by a homophilous model are more likely to also be useful and relevant for the 
potential adopter. Conversely, the experiences of a model that is very different 
from the potential adopter do not necessarily constitute information that is very 
useful and relevant for the adopter.  
Similarity between models and adopters has also been shown to affect the 
diffusion of protest tactics (Soule, 2004). Studies of radical left movements in the 
United States and Germany show that frames and tactics spill over from one 
country to the other as a result of cultural linkages between the two that arise 
from mutual identification (McAdam and Rucht, 1993). In a similar vein, 
Spilerman (1970) hypothesized that collective ethnic identity made the spread of 
violent incidents between ethnic groups possible. Hence social movements 
create channels through which diffusion can take place simply by looking at and 
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identifying (Strang and Meyer, 1993) with similar movements in distant areas. 
The intensity of collective identification among social movement actors 
accelerates diffusion. In her study of the American anti-apartheid movement 
Soule (1997) focused on the proliferation of an innovative demonstrative tactic, 
the sit-in, across university campuses. Her results indicate that protest 
innovations spread more rapidly among university movements that shared 
structural characteristics, such as endowment size and prestige.  
Another key finding from diffusion studies relates to what Rogers calls “selective 
exposure”: “Individuals tend to expose themselves to ideas that are in 
accordance with their interests, needs, and existing attitudes. Individuals 
consciously or unconsciously avoid messages that are in conflict with their 
predispositions” (1995: 164). This mechanism provides an additional reason why 
people are more likely to adopt information from people who are similar to 
themselves. However, people are not only selectively exposed to certain 
examples because these fit their own biases and predispositions, but also 
because people nowadays increasingly depend on the mass media to obtain 
information, and are therefore exposed to prominent coverage about some 
events, and may not learn anything about many other events. Diffusion studies of 
race riots have shown that indeed media coverage is an important determinant of 
diffusion (e.g., Danzger, 1975; Brosius and Esser, 1995; Myers, 2000). More 
recently, several scholars have linked the role of the media to the opportunity 
structure perspective by conceptualizing media attention as a “discursive 
opportunity structure” (Koopmans and Statham, 1999b; Ferree et al., 2002). 
Koopmans and Olzak (2004) have linked this idea to the diffusion perspective 
and showed that those forms of xenophobic violence in Germany were most 
likely to spread that were highly visible in the mass media. Selective exposure 
through the media is also contingent on event characteristics. As Myers (2000) 
demonstrates severe riots are more contagious and influential than smaller ones 
since they attract more media attention.   
Data and dependent variable 
To explore the effect of local conduciveness and diffusion on racist violence we 
analyze data from 1990 to 1995 for all 444 German counties. We track all 
instances of xenophobic violence that were reported in two independently 
collected datasets. The first one was collected as part of a large project covering 
European protest and coercion in twenty-eight European countries from 1980 to 
1995, conducted by social movement scholars affiliated with the University of 
Kansas (Francisco, 1996; Reising, 1999; European Protest and Coercion Data, 
2007). The data were collected from digitally available news resources available 
in the Reuters textline library, which can be accessed through LEXIS NEXIS. The 
Reuters textline library covers over 400 international, national and regional wire 
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services, newspapers and magazines. For each instance of contention, the date, 
geographical location, number of arrests, number of participants, initiating group 
and target were pre-coded by means of the Kansas event data system (KEDS), a 
computer program that is capable of processing news articles and making initial 
coding decisions. The coding decisions were inspected manually and if needed 
adjusted afterwards. This data set includes a total of 253 violent incidents 
targeting foreigners in Germany for the time period 1990-1995. The second file 
utilized in this paper was collected in the context of the MERCI-project 
(Koopmans and Statham, 1999a). The MERCI-file contains violent incidents and 
other strategic political actions in the political field of immigration and integration. 
The data were manually coded from Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of 
the national newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau between 1990 and 1999. This 
database includes the date, geographic location, deaths, arrests and numbers of 
participants of 531 instances of anti-foreigner violence for the time period 1990-
1995. Monthly aggregates of both files correlated highly (.91) indicating the 
comparability and reliability of the measurements. After integration of the files, 61 
doublings, i.e. violent incidents covered both in the Francisco and the MERCI-file 
were merged. Another 36 events in the integrated file occurred in the same 
county on the same day. These so-called tied events were also merged into one 
event since the sequence models employed in this paper cannot handle 
durations of 0. This might be solved by adding up a small portion of time to one of 
the tied events. However this would require knowledge about the exact time 
order of events, which is absent in the present data file. The definitive analysis 
therefore included 687 events that took place in 220 of the 444 counties. Since 
the analysis solely relies on newspaper data one must be aware of the problem 
of selection bias that affects the use of this type of data. Therefore the integrated 
file’s yearly aggregates were correlated with official police statistics obtained from 
the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz to see whether our data indeed grasp 
changes in extreme right violence over time correctly. The high correlation of .82 
between the two sources gives us confidence that our data reflects real 
fluctuations in xenophobic violence. 
Analysis 
We employ event history models to the data described above, focusing on the 
duration of time between violent events in each of the individual counties. We 
start our analysis on 1 January 1990 and end on 31 December 1995. This end 
date was chosen because the Francisco data set only runs until the end of 1995, 
but it also makes sense substantively. Our data (see Figure 1 above), as well as 
police statistics, and historical records (Kurthen, Bergmann and Erb, 1997) 
indicate that the wave of extreme right violence in Germany had subsided by the 
beginning of 1996. In total we analyze 1,131 subjects: 687 that end in racist 
violence and 444 spells that are right censored.  
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We make use of partial likelihood estimation as developed by Cox (Cox and 
Oakes, 1984). Cox regression, as opposed to other event history techniques; has 
as a main advantage that one does not need to specify the baseline hazard. 
Although some tools are available in current statistical packages to evaluate the 
parameterization of the baseline hazard, final choices for a parametric model 
should always be based on strong theoretical assumptions (Blossfeld and 
Rohwer, 2002), which are not always present in current social inquiry (but see 
Olzak, 1992).  
However, in specifying a Cox model two considerations should be taken into 
account. First of all it posits that variables included in the model shift the baseline 
hazard multiplicatively and that these shifts are constant over time: the 
proportional hazard assumption. This assumption can be tested by means of a 
Schoenfeld residual test. Schoenfeld residuals can be retrieved for each 
covariate by calculating the difference between the covariate value for a failed 
observation and the mean covariate value of all subjects at risk when the failure 
took place. Accordingly one has to fit a function of time to them and test whether 
there is a relationship. If the slope of the time effect does not significantly differ 
from zero, the proportional hazards assumption is met (Gould and Cleves, 2004). 
Inspection of the Schoenfeld residuals indicated that the proportional hazard 
assumption of our models was not significantly violated.  
Second, the baseline hazard for event occurrence might vary across entities 
facing different structural settings. In light of this study it is likely that the baseline 
hazard varies between East and West Germany since so short after Germany’s 
unification there was a high degree of social and economic divergence between 
the two regions. According to Heitmeyer (1993) it would not go too far to view 
East and West Germany as two completely separate societies only connected by 
institutional processes. Whether the xenophobic mobilization studied in this paper 
indeed took place in two completely different social settings can be checked by 
inspecting how the hazard of xenophobic violence evolved over time in the two 
regions separately. The estimated cumulative baseline hazard functions for East 
and West Germany show that xenophobic violence indeed evolved differently in 
both regions. Therefore we have stratified all observations by East/West region. 
Stratified models allow the baseline hazard to vary over groups but at the same 
time estimate coefficients that are constrained to be homogeneous and therefore 
allow for the inference of general causal relations for both regions. As a 
robustness check, we have also estimated a non-stratified model with an East-
West dummy. Results were very similar. In addition, we estimated separate 
models for counties in East and West Germany. These models were also largely 
consistent with the ones presented below. 
In our analysis, 130 counties experienced more than one instance of racist 
violence. Therefore our models are susceptible to unobserved heterogeneity 
leading to a downward bias in standard errors. We follow Myers (1997, 2000) in 
solving this problem by including a variable that taps the history of racist violence 
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for every county by counting the number of prior violent events that occurred. 
Since we also include variables that show more over time than geographical 
variation, such as the severity and visibility of previous violence, our observations 
are also nested in time points. We therefore estimate standard errors without 
assuming that counties measured on the same day are independent from each 
other.  
Independent variables  
For all independent variables multicollinearity statistics were inspected that did 
not indicate problems. A correlation matrix is presented in Table A-1 in the 
Appendix. We begin by describing the variables that only vary cross-sectionally 
over counties. All data, unless indicated otherwise are collected from the 1994 
Statistical Yearbook for Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994).1  
Ethnic competition. The proportion of foreigners as reported in the year 1994 and 
unemployment rates for the year 1993 are used as measures of ethnic 
competition. In line with ethnic competition theories we expect both variables to 
have a positive effect on the propensity for violence.2  
Social disorganization. We use the total migration flow in and out of the county in 
thousands to gauge the social dislocation of a community. We further use the 
emigration surplus as an indicator of unfavorable socio-economic conditions in a 
county. Many rural East German areas experienced strong population losses due 
to emigration during the period of study, spurred by a lack of jobs and other 
opportunities for social mobility. Finally, we also use average life expectancy as 
an indicator of social problems. Parts of East Germany experienced significant 
drops in life expectancy as a result of the turmoil of reunification. Social 
disorganization theories lead us to expect more violence in counties that have 
high levels of migration, an emigration surplus, and a lower life expectancy.  
Political opportunity structure. The percentages of votes in the 1994 Bundestag 
elections for the main extreme right party (the Republikaner), as well as for the 
established conservative parties (CDU and CSU), are used as indicators of the 
                                                     
1   Statistics for East German counties were not immediately available after reunification 
in October 1990. In addition, in the years immediately after reunification many borders 
of East German counties were redrawn. We were therefore constrained to measure 
many independent variables time invariant, for the first year for which data are 
available after the redrawing of county boundaries, i.e. 1994. For some variables of 
potential interest – such as the local gross domestic product – data are incomplete for 
the entire period of our study. We therefore had to exclude these variables from the 
analysis. 
2   We also tried an interaction term of both variables. Due to serious problems of 
multicollinearity (the interaction term and the percentage of foreigners correlated 
almost .90) we decided not to include this interaction term in our model. 
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political opportunity structure. Previous studies of social movement mobilization 
lead us to expect that the stronger the electoral power of extreme right and 
moderate right parties, the lower will be the intensity of extreme right violence. 
The data has been collected from the election atlas3. 
Control variables concerning the size and status of counties. All other things 
being equal, more populous counties will have a greater likelihood to experience 
a violent event than sparsely populated counties. In addition, violence in capital 
cities of the sixteen German federal states may attract more media attention 
because these are the places where media and wire service correspondents are 
concentrated. We control for these two county characteristics by including a 
Capital dummy and the population size in thousands.  
We now move over to the description of the diffusion variables that vary for each 
county-day combination.  
General diffusion. This variable counts the number of previous violent events that 
took place in all the other 443 counties. We experimented with several 
specifications and opted for a period of seven days. This is in line with earlier 
findings of ethnic violence in the U.S. (Myers, 1997). We did not include a time-
decaying element as proposed by Myers (2000) since this complicates the 
interpretation of the coefficient. We expect a general positive effect between 
violence in other counties on the violence hazard.4 
Geographical proximity. We used the inversed score of the closest county in 
which a violent racist attack took place in the preceding seven days to grasp the 
effect of geographical proximity. If for instance during the previous seven days 
two violent events took place, the proximity score of the geographically closest 
county is used. Distances between counties were calculated by means of the 
Great circle distance method. Theories on direct-tie diffusion would lead us to 
expect that there is a positive association between the violence hazard and the 
geographical distance of previous incidents of xenophobic violence.5 
Severity. To tap the severity of violence we developed a scale based on four 
indicators: the number of participants in a violent event, the number of injuries, 
the number of deaths and the amount of arrests in such events during the 
previous seven days. A reasonable scale (α=.66) was developed by taking the 
mean z-score. Severe violence is expected to receive more exposure, leading to 
more diffusion in subsequent time periods. 
                                                     
3   www.wahlatlas.de, data retrieved on September 7, 2004. 
4   We also experimented with a squared diffusion term to model the decaying effect of 
diffusion. This did not alter the relations presented below. However we decided not to 
include the variable because its inclusion caused some concern with respect to 
multicollinearity.  
5   We also experimented with the mean inverted distance and the square inverse root 
functions (Hedstrom 1996; Andrews and Biggs, 2006) of distance. Results with all 
three parameters are similar.  
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Media visibility. Three types of media visibility are measured to test selective 
exposure arguments.  
 
 Visual: the percentage of events in other counties in the preceding month 
that was covered with an accompanying photograph. 
 Front page: the percentage of events in other counties in the preceding 
month that was covered on the front page. 
 Both datasets: the percentage of events in other counties in the preceding 
month that was covered in both the Koopmans and Francisco datasets on 
extreme right violence in Germany.  
Since all variables are highly skewed all values were log-transformed.6 All three 
indicators are expected to make preceding events more visible to prospective 
imitators. Previous events that were accompanied by visual cues in the media, 
and that received front page coverage are more likely to be imitated than those 
that received less coverage. Because the two datasets are based on different 
media samples, we interpret the presence of an event in both datasets also as an 
indicator of media visibility. The higher the number of media sources that cover 
an event, the more likely it is that this event will cause copycat events elsewhere.  
Social similarity (homophily). Six measures that gauge social similarity between 
transmitters and adopters of collective violence are utilized. First of all we 
consider the share of incidents in the preceding week that occurred in the same 
Bundesland and same part of the county (East or West Germany) to be important 
indicators of political and socio-cultural similarity. Only a few years after 
reunification, the division between East and West was (and to this day is) an 
important cleavage in German society and an important source of collective 
identification. The same also holds for the federal states, which are not only 
political and administrative units with a substantial amount of autonomy, 
particularly in the cultural domain, but also an important source of identification, 
although the extent of such emotional attachments varies somewhat from one 
Bundesland to the other. We therefore expect activists to be more strongly 
influenced by previous events that occurred in the same part of Germany and in 
the same federal state, even when we control for geographical distance. 
We also expect other indicators of political, socio-economic, and demographic 
similarity to play a role. We expect activists to be more strongly influenced by 
previous events in other counties that are perceived as being similar to their own 
county in the sense that they are populated by similar people (rural/urban) with a 
similar political leaning (left/right). The rural/urban and left/right divides are 
influential cleavages in German society and therefore play an important role with 
respect to social identification (Lepsius, 1990). In addition, we assume that 
activists will be more inclined to copy behaviour from people who are confronted 
                                                     
6   1 was added to deal with zero values. 
 12 
with a similar demographic situation in terms of the level of immigration. For 
instance, we expect conservative rural counties with small immigrant populations 
to be especially influenced by counties with similar characteristics, particularly if 
they are in addition situated in the same part of the country and in the same 
Bundesland. Net of these specific measures of social similarity, geographical 
distance may still pick up unmeasured aspects of similarity, although we hope 
that by including our detailed measurement of specific similarity measures we 
can wholly or largely explain away the theoretically underspecified geographic 
distance effect. Political left/right similarity is measured as the inversed difference 
in the percentage of CDU/CSU votes between a particular county and the most 
similar county that had an event in the preceding week.7 Socio-economic 
similarity is measured by the inversed difference in the percentage of the working 
population that is employed in the agrarian sector between a particular county 
and the most similar county that had an event in the preceding seven days.8 
Demographic similarity is measured by the inversed difference in the percentage 
of foreigners between a particular county and the most similar county that 
experienced an instance of racist violence during the preceding seven days.  
Time-varying control variables. Earlier research on xenophobic violence in 
Germany shows that such events occurred disproportionately on weekend nights, 
often linked to excessive alcohol consumption (e.g., Willems and Hill, 1993). In 
addition, we explore systematic seasonal variation, in particular whether violence 
was more likely during the warmer months of the year when many people, both 
racist perpetrators and their victims, are out in the streets. We therefore control in 
our analysis for weekend days and the summer months. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the results of the stratified Cox regression. We present hazard 
ratios, the hazard of a particular case divided by the hazard of a case that scores 
one point lower on the relevant covariate. In the first model we include the 
measures that tap the conduciveness of counties to violence, adding controls for 
previous incidents in a county (history of violence), population size, whether a 
county is a political capital or not, as well as the summer and weekend dummies. 
                                                     
7   We additionally considered similarity measures based on the percentage of votes for 
the Greens, the PDS (post-communists), and the Republikaner, but these did not 
attain significance once the CDU-based variable was introduced. We therefore 
concluded that the percentage of CDU votes best summarizes the political leaning of 
a county.  
8   We additionally considered similarity regarding industrial employment, but found no 
significant effects once percentage agrarian was included. We therefore concluded 
that the cleavage between urban and rural counties, which is best captured by the 
percentage employed in the agrarian sector is the most relevant measure of social 
similarity for the case at hand.  
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As expected, we find positive effects for capital cities for population size. In line 
with previous research the model shows that extreme right violence is 
overrepresented during weekends, when the violence risk is almost 90 percent 
higher than on regular weekdays. Xenophobic violence is however not more 
likely to occur during the summer months. Although the parameter has a 
considerable positive effect in the first model, it turns insignificant when the two 
diffusion parameters are added, indicating that the summer effect is actually 
mediated by diffusion.    
Turning to the more theoretically interesting results of the first model, we find 
some support for ethnic competition theories. The number of foreign immigrants 
in a county has a positive impact on violence. A county with a one percent higher 
immigrant population share has a six percent higher violence hazard. While this 
immigrant effect is substantial, we find no association between unemployment 
rates and ethnic violence, providing only partial support for the notion that ethnic 
violence follows from competition between ethnic groups over scarce resources 
such as jobs.  
The first model also shows considerable support for social disorganization 
theories. Population instability in the form of high migration flows increase the 
rate of xenophobic violence. Crisis-ridden counties that experience net population 
losses due to emigration also have higher rates of violence. By contrast, areas 
with a higher than average life expectancy experience fewer xenophobic events. 
In line with disorganization theories we thus find that xenophobic violence is 
associated with anomic conditions and social problems.  
We additionally find strong support for political opportunity structure approaches. 
The electoral strength of both extreme right and moderate right parties has an 
inhibiting effect on violent mobilization. Xenophobes in counties where the right, 
and especially the extreme right, has a stronger position in local parliaments are 
less inclined to revert to violent tactics. In a county with one percent more votes 
for extreme right parties the intensity of extreme right violence is more than 30 
percent lower. The second model in table 1 goes beyond the precipitating 
conditions in particular counties and introduces two general measure of diffusion, 
the effect of previous events in other counties, and the geographical proximity 
variable. The number of violent events during the previous seven days in the rest 
of Germany, which taps general diffusion processes, has a strong and positive 
influence on subsequent rates of anti-foreigner violence in a particular county. 
Each preceding incident results in 0.04 percent more violence. The geographical 
proximity variable is also significant and in the predicted direction, offering 
preliminary support for the notion that violence in counties close to a given county 
has an additional positive effect over and above the general diffusion effect.  
Model 2 adds the variables relating to the severity of previous events, and the 
intensity of media coverage that they attracted. The results support our selective 
exposure predictions. Severe violence and violence that appears on the front 
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Table 1:  Cox regression stratified by East/West region of instances of  
anti-foreigner violence in Germany 1990-1995 on county and  
event characteristics 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Clustered 
S. E. 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Clustered 
S. E. 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Clustered 
S. E. 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Clustered 
S. E. 
History of 
violence 1.017 .014 1.016 .014 1.027** .014 1.027** .013 
Summer 1.838** .265 1.192 .167 1.048 .140 1.061 .142 
Weekend 1.876** .266 1.817** .227 1.825** .222 1.823** .220 
Population 1.002** .001 1.003** .001 1.002** .001 1.003** .001 
Capital 1.520** .236 1.474** .229 1.472** .228 1.541** .240 
Unemployment 1.006 .013 1.004 .014 1.006 .014 1.007 .014 
Foreigners 1.070** .017 1.063** .018 1.064** .018 1.066** .018 
Total migration 1.431** .201 1.420** .190 1.441** .192 1.486** .200 
Emigration 
surplus 2.602* 1.111 2.646* 1.139 2.480* 1.059 2.010* .800 
Life expectancy .872** .035 .891** .035 .892** .035 .884** .034 
Votes 
 extreme right .692** .050 .719** .052 .721** .052 .739** .053 
Votes 
 moderate right .985** .006 .983** .006 .982** .006 .986** .006 
General Diffusion  1.039** .005 1.036** .005 1.037** .005 
Geographic proximity  3.575** .732 2.169** .521 .521 1.073 
Violence severity    1.466** .162 1.417** .151 
Front page     2.903** .930 2.840** .915 
Both data sets     3.633* 2.188 3.271* 1.877 
Photo     5.162** 3.339 5.628** 3.567 
Same Bundesland      2.345** .554 
Same region        1.266 .223 
Political similarity,      1.635** .334 
Economic similarity      1.476** .245 
Demographic similarity      1.443** .224 
         
Log-Pseudo-
likelihood -3862.2  -3626.67  -3601.34  -3580.39  
         
Spells 1131  1131  1131  1131  
Failures  687  687  687  687  
         
*  p < .05 (one tailed). 
**p < .01 (one tailed). 
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page, is visualized with a photo, or which is reported in more than one media 
source diffuses faster than violent events that receive less exposure.  
In the third and final model we enter the social similarity variables. Nearly all 
estimated coefficients support homophily arguments of diffusion. Preceding 
violence has a stronger impact on subsequent rates of mobilization when it 
occurs in the same Bundesland and is initiated in politically and socio-
economically similar regions that are confronted with similar rates of foreigners. 
The effect of preceding violence that occurs in the same East/West region is also 
positive and in the expected direction, but it does not reach statistical 
significance. Hence we conclude that our theoretical expectation is confirmed 
that local right-wing activists were more inclined to copy behaviour from their 
counterparts in counties where people experience similar economic, political, and 
demographic circumstances. Interestingly, geographical distance becomes 
insignificant once the similarity indices are included in the model. This indicates 
that the effect of geographical distance is actually caused, as Tarde suggested, 
not by geographical proximity as such, but by the fact that proximate areas tend 
to be socially similar. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have tried to embed research on xenophobic violence in a 
framework that combines notions on structural conduciveness with diffusion 
theory. Contrary to previous studies on extreme right violence in Germany we 
focus on the most fine-grained administrative unit for which statistical data are 
available in Germany, the county. This allowed us to test in more detail than 
before whether dominant theories of ethnic violence such as ethnic competition 
theories, social disorganization perspectives and political opportunity approaches 
can account for extreme right violence. Our analysis partially supports the first 
approach and finds suggestive evidence for the latter two perspectives.  
In addition, our study design offered opportunities to investigate how and when 
ethnic violence spread from one geographical area to another. In line with 
previous studies we find that selective exposure, caused by the severity of 
violence and the intensity of media coverage reinforces diffusion processes. 
Moreover our results show that violence spreads more rapidly among certain 
categories of counties. Violent behaviour is imitated more rapidly when the 
adopting and transmitting counties resemble each other with respect to political, 
socio-economic, and demographic structures. This confirms the theoretical 
assumption that similar actors are more inclined to identify with each other, which 
subsequently leads to a form of mutual understanding and connectedness that 
carries diffusion processes (Strang and Meyer, 1993). Tactics that are used by 
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homophilous models are moreover more likely to be useful and relevant to 
potential adopters than tactics of heterophilous models. 
A particularly interesting result of our analysis is that geographical distance, 
which in our initial models affected the diffusion of violence turned out to have no 
substantial effect anymore once we controlled for social similarity. This is 
suggestive evidence for the importance of homophily since it implies that it is not 
confounded by geographical proximity. This result also indicates that the spatial 
diffusion effects that are found in many studies may actually be crude proxies of 
social similarity, which lose significance once more specific measures of social 
similarity are taken into account. There is a tendency among recent scholars of 
social movement diffusion to regard geographical distance as a measurement of 
existing network ties (Hedstrom, 1994; Myers, 2000; Andrews and Biggs, 2006). 
However, if distance does not affect diffusion once controls for social similarity 
are added this notion might have to be reconsidered.  
However, for our present study we did not have actual measurements of social 
networks at our disposal so the question whether geographical distance to some 
extent captures network relations remains unresolved. It is very well possible that 
part of the shared variance between social and geographically similarity covaries 
with network ties, as birds of a feather tend to flock together (Lazardsfeld and 
Merton, 1954). In order to further investigate the relationship between geographi-
cal proximity, social similarity, and network ties, we are currently planning to 
collect data on sports league networks (especially amateur soccer leagues), 
fascist band tours, and organizational networks of extreme right organizations to 
disentangle actual networks among right-wing youth in Germany.  
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Table A-1: Correlation matrix of independent and control variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
  1. History 1.00                       
  2. Summer .01 1.00                      
  3. Weekend .00 .00 1.00                     
  4. Inhabitants .47 .00 .00 1.00                    
  5. Capital .31 .00 .00 .44 1.00                   
  6. Unempl .18 .00 .00 -.07 .01 1.00                  
  7. Forei -.03 .00 .00 .35 .20 -.47 1.00                 
  8. SocialD -.15 .00 .00 -.05 -.13 -.47 .20 1.00                
  9. Emigrati -.18 .00 .00 -.09 -.26 -.19 -.19 .36 1.00               
10. Life expec -.24 .00 .00 .03 .00 -.49 .34 .28 .13 1.00              
11. Vote extr -.16 .00 .00 -.03 -.06 -.46 .46 .22 .01 .27 1.00             
12. Vote m -.24 .00 .00 -.22 -.21 -.34 -.11 .19 .29 .25 .37 1.00            
13. Gendiff .00 .09 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00           
14. Geo.  .05 .07 .02 .00 .00 .01 -.01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .37 1.00          
15. Sev -.02 .06 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .37 .61 1.00         
16. Fronte .01 .06 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .08 .25 .16 1.00        
17. BothD -.03 .09 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .09 .12 .18 .14 1.00       
18. Photo .01 .14 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .20 .13 .07 .05 .01 1.00      
19. S. Bun .02 .00 .00 -.01 -.01 .03 -.02 -.02 .01 -.03 -.04 -.01 .09 .24 .11 .06 .02 .04 1.00     
20. S.E/W .03 .03 .01 -.01 .01 .05 -.04 -.02 -.01 -.03 -.01 -.01 .20 .57 .25 .13 .01 .09 -.03 1.00    
21. Poll sim. .09 .04 .01 .08 .08 .03 .16 -.06 -.16 .04 -.02 -.14 .37 .70 .46 .19 .08 .11 .17 .39 1.00   
22. Soc sim. .08 .04 .01 .05 .03 .06 .04 -.02 -.05 -.02 -.07 -.19 .38 .57 .38 .19 .07 .12 .19 .33 .54 1.00  
23. Pr sim. .05 .05 .01 -.05 -.03 .08 -.16 -.03 .02 -.07 -.08 .01 .40 .67 .48 .19 .10 .14 .25 .47 .53 .46 1.00 
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